The LCMS Blue Ribbon Task Force on Synodical Structure and Governance has issued its final report, titled “Congregations Walking Together in Mission: The Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Task Force on Synod Structure and Governance” (hereafter CWTIM). An evaluation of the final report, titled “A Brief Analysis of CWTIM” is available at this web site at a separate post. The “Brief Analysis” categorizes the proposals into “good,” “indifferent,” and “bad.”
With regard to the “bad” proposals, we do not believe that Recommendations #1, 5, 6, 11, 13, 17, and 20 can, or should be, revised or amended. They simply need to be defeated at the convention. Nor do we believe that the portion of Recommendation #3 that changes the nomination process for circuit counselors can, or should be revised or amended. It just needs to be defeated. If district presidents control or influence the nomination process as proposed, they will control the election of circuit counselors and thereby take that right away from congregations. The current structure, constitution, and bylaws have 160 years of experience that, in these areas, cannot be improved upon.
What remains are Recommendations #3, 10, and 18. #3 and #10 will be addressed in another article. What follows is an alternate plan to recommendation #18 in the Blue Ribbon Task Force’s final report.
LCMS National Offices
In his response to the final report of the Blue Ribbon Task Force, dated December 1, 2009, President Kieschnick devotes more space to Recommendation #18 than any other. This is understandable, since the LCMS national offices are the agencies with which he has day-to-day contact. The LCMS International Center is his work environment and so he is in a good position to report to the synod on the problems that he sees there.
On page 6 of his response, the president reports that one program board has experienced a negative variance (i.e., more expenses than revenue) totaling millions of dollars over the past several years. He reports that another board approved travel budgets of several hundred thousand dollars for one fiscal year. Another board, not either of those two above, discovered significant over-expenditures of its budget after its executive director left. The president reports that a number of boards find it difficult to balance their budget, relying heavily on large bequests to fund operating expenses. He reports that budget management and revenue coordination are quite complex. He reports that collaboration between and among boards is very difficult. He reports that some executive directors spend significant time and other resources dealing with board or commission matters, rather than directly accomplishing the work they are called to do. He reports, in agreement with the Task Force, that national offices are often complex, inefficient, unresponsive, programmatically redundant, lacking in accountability, difficult to manage, and expensive to operate. These reports from the president are very helpful and we appreciate his candor. These reports are, in fact, part of his constitutional responsibility (LCMS Constitution XI, B.2).
The question is: What can be done about these problems? Anyone who has been a manager, or executive, of a large corporation at the middle- or upper-management levels knows that these are common problems in all corporations. If they were not problems, there would be no reason to hire so many managers to supervise so many different things. Management is an art that befuddles the most brilliant people in the world! It is one reason that Jesus told so many parables about good and bad managers (i.e., stewards). The president should not feel that he is a failure because the national offices are caught in a bureaucratic morass. He would only fail his duty if he failed to report these things to us, the synod!
So, what can be done about these problems? The solution proposed by the Task Force creates a new officer, “Chief Mission Officer” (hereafter CMO), appointed by and directly accountable to the president of the synod. Under the CMO would be placed all the functions of current program-board offices, including the universities and seminaries. All the current offices would be merged into four: national mission, international mission, seminary, and communications. One new office would be added: fundraising. The president would also have two “president’s advisory commissions,” one for national and one for international mission, elected by the synod. The advisory commissions would have no authority except to give counsel, and there would be no program boards accountable to the synod.
In his December 1, 2009 response, President Kieschnick suggests another solution, namely, that all the program boards be consolidated into two program boards, rather than two advisory commissions, although his proposal for their authority is not clear. It is obvious that the president wants “the direct or indirect responsibility to supervise the day-to-day work of the employees of the synod” and “a method of intervention should either board violate the constitution, bylaws, or resolutions of the synod” (Dec. 1, 2009 letter, pp. 7-8). This is a less drastic change than that offered by the Task Force, but makes clear his belief that he should have the ability to take action against employees or boards of the synod, when in his judgment it becomes necessary.
Before we make our own proposal, we should ask: Why has the LCMS never given the synodical president the authority that President Kieschnick wants? No president before him has asked for this sort of authority, either privately or publicly. The synod has had one or two autocratic presidents, but none have had the boldness (or audacity, depending on your view) to close down the program boards and make all the national offices (excepting the corporate entities) subordinate to him. This is an unprecedented request for power. It could be that President Kieschnick is right, and that his solution is the only effective one. But we need to ask: Why not before this time?
The Missouri Synod over the years has kept various functions, programs, boards, and executives separate from the president, so that he could concentrate on his job of “promoting true unity of spirit.” Until relatively recently, synod bylaws stated the president “shall exercise executive power only when the affairs of the Synod demand it and when he has been expressly invested with such power for such specific purpose” (e.g., 1960 bylaw 2.29.a). Synod was always concerned that the national presidency, as Frederick Wyneken said, “might precipitate and even initiate a power that, instead of promoting true unity of spirit, might turn into a spirit of servitude” (see Frederick Wyneken, “Can We Divide and Remain United?” in Matthew Harrison, At Home in the House of My Fathers [n.p.: Lutheran Legacy Press, 2009], p. 375).
Do you see how Wyneken and the founders of the synod understood the presidency? The synod president, through his example of leadership either promotes the collegiality and equality envisioned by Luther, Walther, and our greatest synodical presidents OR he promotes a spirit of servility. He can’t do both at the same time. Which spirit has President Kieschnick been promoting: collegiality or servility?
It is the same as how a pastor leads a congregation. He can say that he is a “servant of the congregation,” but the people who work with him every day will soon know whether this is true or not. When a pastor, by himself or through allies, starts making changes to bylaws in order to give himself more authority, you know he is not a “servant” and he is not promoting collegiality or true unity of spirit by his example.
What, then, should be done about the real problems of poor collaboration, and even competition, between executive directors and their frequent failures in the area of financial management? These are problems that are too big and complex for the synodical president. His “ecclesiastical” jobs of representing synod to other churches, overseeing doctrine and ecclesial practice, working with the district presidents, and representing synod to national and international authorities is more than enough for one man, even with an office full of extremely competent assistants.
The “administrative” jobs of keeping the executive directors and national boards mutually cooperative, efficient, fiscally cooperative with the CFO and Board of Directors, and in accord with the national convention is another full-time job. Why not give those jobs, through new bylaws, to the First Vice-President of the synod, who is already a full-time employee? He is nominated directly by congregations and elected directly by the synod in national convention and directly accountable to it. But under current bylaws, the First Vice-President has no real official duties of any real significance, unless the President decides to give him something to do.
Why not give the First Vice-President the “administrative” job of overseeing the executive directors and program boards, in the areas of mutual cooperation, efficiency, fiscal cooperation, and accord with convention resolutions, and some real authority to take the directors or boards to task if they err? “Taking to task” here means that the First Vice-President reprimands the executive director privately, then if that fails, reports the problem to the respective board. If the board supports the error, then the First Vice-President would be obligated to report the problem to the synod, via the Reporter, and then ultimately in the Convention Workbook. A key advantage to the president of the synod, in this proposal, is that he will not become mired in conflicts with executives or program boards since the First Vice-President will not “report” to him for this work. Instead, the president will be able to focus on his traditional duties, as well as giving the overall direction to synodical work as the Blue Ribbon Task Force proposals envision.
The first main difference between our proposal and the Task Force proposal is that our proposal has administrative oversight being done by an official elected by the synod and accountable to it, while the Task Force proposal has an appointed “underling” to the President doing this work, who is only accountable to the president, not to the synod. Thus we are against proposed bylaw 3.12.2.4. The second main difference between our proposal and the Task Force proposal is that our proposal continues to place the responsibilities of hiring (or calling), evaluating, and firing the executive directors with the program boards, while the Task Force proposal really gives those powers to the President.
It is no secret at the national offices that President Kieschnick has fought against numerous boards to control their election of executive directors. During his tenure, the synod has had more (and longer terms of) “interim directors” than the rest of its history combined. President Kieschnick has intepreted current bylaw 3.3.1.3 (d) to mean he can veto any appointment by program boards. In some cases, he has continued to “hold out” until the program boards chose his nominee, which was obviously not the purpose of that bylaw. The result has been numerous and lengthy stalemates between program boards and the president, while the work of the synod and morale at the national offices has suffered. We believe that bylaw 3.3.1.3 (d) needs to be changed to let the president advise regarding executive director appointments, but let the boards have the final decisions for their executive’s hiring, evaluating, and firing.
With regard to other powers of the president, we notice that the proposed bylaws give the president direct power over the seminaries, synodical fund-raising, and over the approval of the Chief Financial Officer. We believe that, again, this puts far too much power in the president’s hands. Therefore we oppose proposed bylaws 3.3.1.3 (f), 3.3.1.3 (g), and 3.4.1.1.
With regard to the problems of financial management, we notice that the proposed bylaws include a number of provisions that strengthen the authority of the Board of Directors in financial areas. We approve of these bylaws, specifically proposed bylaws 3.3.1.3 (e), 3.3.5.5 (d), 3.3.5.5 (e), and 3.6.6.5.
With regard to the number of program boards and commissions, if this is really a problem, we suggest the following structure: 1) Board for Higher Education, which includes supervision over seminaries, pre-sem programs, commissioned-church-worker training programs, universities, distance learning, and continuing education, including the functions of current Commission on Ministerial Growth and Support; 2) Board for Missions, which includes supervision over international missions, national ethnic missions and ministries, special-needs ministries, campus ministry, and armed forces ministry; 3) Board for Human Care and Relief, which includes supervision over international and domestic relief, deaconness organizations, coordination of social ministry organizations and RSOs, and work with human rights organizations; 4) Board for Parish Services, which supervises synodical programs in the areas of evangelism, stewardship, fiscal management, lay leadership training, parochial schools, youth, singles, worship–including functions of current Commission on Worship, and Laborers for Christ; 5) Commission on Theology and Church Relations, which would include current functions of the present CTCR and the Commission on Doctrinal Review; and 6) Commission on Constitutional Matters, which would include current functions of the present CCM and the Commission on Structure.
All members of these four boards and two commissions should be elected by the national convention, in the normal fashion. If the synod wants to save on board expenses, it can reduce the members of each board and commission to five members each. In the current economy and synodical fiscal environment, it is clear that some needs will go unmet and some staff position will remain vacant. Each board and commission will have to decide which ministries and staff positions it will be able to fund and which it will have to leave unfilled, for now. That is one of the most important jobs that the boards have, namely, setting fiscal priorities for the executive directors who oversee their work. Without such priorities, program boards will tend to end up with negative variances in their attempt to do everything worthwhile.
Finally, we think that the president will be happy to know that we agree that the work of the present Communication Services should be under his direct supervision. The present Board of Communication Services should be eliminated, and its functions merged into a department under the president. How else can the president set the tone of conversation and strive for true unity of spirit, unless his communicators really agree with him? This would include the Reporter, the office of news and information, the Lutheran Witness, and the synodical web-site. All other boards or departments that are not mentioned above should be under the direct authority of the LCMS Board of Directors through the Chief Administrative Officer or the Chief Financial Officer, as they presently are.
Conclusion
This is an alternate plan to that proposed by the Blue Ribbon Task Force, under their Recommendation #18, pertaining to the matter of the LCMS national offices. We hope that the delegates will seriously consider both this alternate plan and its rationale, which are so vital to avoiding a centralization of power in the president and retaining the representative system of government that has been found in the Missouri Synod.
